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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SALT LAKE CITY,
APPELLANT'S REPLY
BRIEF

Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs,
DIMITRIOS DESLIS,

Case No. 980269-CA

Defendant/Appellant,

ARGUMENT
THE CITY FAILS TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE CONDUCT OF APPELLANT
DID NOT CONSTITUTE HARBORING OR CONCEALING UNDER THE
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE ORDINANCE
The City argues that there was sufficient evidence upon
which the trial court could have found Appellant to be harboring or
concealing the offender under subsection

(b) of the ordinance.

Appellant refers this Court to its opening brief regarding this

argument. Furthermore, Appellant submits that an affirmative act is
necessary in order to be convicted under this section.
In 1972, the Utah Supreme Court decided the case of
v. Ludlow,

State

28 Utah 2d 434, 503 P.2d 1210 (Utah 1972), attached as

Exhibit I. That case involved an employer charged with Obstruction
of Justice for failing to bring an employee out of the factory so
she could be served with judicial process. Id.

The court in

Ludlow

held that such conduct did not constitute Obstruction of Justice.
Appellant submits that failing to produce the employee did involves
an affirmative act on the part of the employer, yet the court still
did not qualify that action as consituting Obstruction of Justice.
Appellant submits that if such an affirmative act on the
part of the defendnat in Ludlow

cannot be sufficient to constitute

an offense of Obstruction of Justice, neither can the passive
refusal of Appellant to give information to the officers in the
instant case.
Similarly, Appellant cites to a California Supreme Court
case for proposition held in Ludlow,

supra.

In People

v.

Wetzel,

520 P.2d 416 (Cal. 1974), attached as Exhibit II, the court held

-2-

that

the

defendant's

actions

of

standing

in her

doorway

and

refusing the officer's request to enter and search for a suspect,
did not constitute obstruction of justice.
The court in Itfetzel, further agreed with defendant's
contention that she committed no offense by "passively asserting a
constitutional right." Id.

at 417. The court concluded that "the

defendant's total conduct cannot be characterized other than a
refusal to consent

to a request to enter her apartment. Such

conduct cannot constitute grounds for a lawful arrest . . ." Id. at
419. Appellant submits that his conduct is actually less agregious
than the

conduct

exhibited

by Wetzel, and

that

he, too, was

asserting a valid constitutional right.
The City argues that Appellant had no constitutional
rights to assert, however, Appellant has already argued in his
Opening Brief to the contrary.

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Based upon the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests
this Court reverse his conviction, based upon the fact that the

-3-

evidence presented was not sufficient for a finding of Obstruction
of Justice.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of November, 1998.

YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant

By
RONALD J. YENGICH

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby declare that I mailed/delivered two true and
correct copies of the foregoing Appellant's Reply Brief, postage
prepaid, this

day of November, 1998, to:

Augustus G. Chin
Assistant Salt Lake City Prosecutor
451 South 200 East
Room 125
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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deponents on whose evidence the information or indictment was based shall be
indorsed thereon before it is presented,
and the prosecuting attorney shall indorse on the information or indictment
at such time as the court may by rule or
otherwise prescribe the names of such
other witnesses as he proposes to call.
A failure to so indorse the said names
shall not affect the validity or sufficiency of the information or indictment, but
the court in which the information or indictment was filed shall, upon application
of the defendant, direct the names of
such witnesses to be indorsed. No continuance shall be allowed because of the
failure to indorse any of the said names
unless such application was made at the
earliest opportunity and then only if a
continuance is necessary in the interest
of justice.
This section clearly provides that if the
prosecutor proposes to call witnesses other
than those who testified at the preliminary
hearing and fails to place their names on
the information, the court shall direct him
to do so upon application of the defendant.
Besides the lack of error in the delay in
writing the additional names on the information, the prosecutor had furnished a bill
of particulars to counsel for the appellant,
wherein he stated that he would call
George Perry Lang as a witness.
[4] During the trial the prosecutor
called the chief of police as a witness for
the purpose of laying a foundation for introducing certain exhibits in evidence; and
since the chief had access to the locker
where those exhibits were kept, the prosecutor thought it proper to show that the
witness had not tampered with those exhibits while awaiting trial. The name of this
witness had not been placed upon the information nor given in the bill of particulars.
We are unable to see how any prejudice
resulted from permitting the witness to tell
the jury that he had not tampered with the
evidence, or in the failure of the prosecu-

STATE v. LUDLOW

tor to place his name on the information
before trial started.
We find no error and, therefore, affirm
the judgment of the trial court.
CALLISTER, C J., and TUCKETT,
H E N R I O D , and CROCKETT, ]]., concur.

O

that deputy sheriff could serve her with
a small claims court order, and where defendant had no objection to service during
various work breaks, including coffee, but
did object to service during working hours
on ground that manufacture work in question involved dangers if impeded. U.C.A.
1953, 78-28-54.

I KEY NUMBER STSTE^,

v.

Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., William
T. Evans, Asst. Atty. Gen., Carl J. Xemelka, Salt Lake County Atty., Donald Sawaya,
Larry R. Keller, Asst. County Att>s., Salt
Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant.

Roy S. L U D L O W , Defendant and
Respondent.

Paul X. Cotro-Manes, Salt Lake City,
for defendant and respondent.

28 Utah 2d 434
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellant,

No. 12981.

Supreme Court of Utah.
Dec. 1, 1972.

The Third District Court, Salt Lake
County, D. Frank Wilkins, J., entered judgment quashing information charging defendant with obstructing an officer in performing his duty, and State appealed. The
Supreme Court, Henriod, J., held that trial
court did not err in quashing the information, where information was based on defendant's refusal to bring a female employee out of factory so that deputy sheriff
could serve her with a small claims court
order, and where defendant had no objection to service during various work breaks,
including coffee, but did object to service
during working hours on ground that
manufacture work in question involved
dangers if impeded.
Affirmed.
Ellett, J., concurred in result.

Obstructing Justice C=>7

Quashing of information charging defendant with obstructing an officer in performing his duty was not error, where information was based on defendant's refusal
to bring female employee out of factory so

Utah

12H

O t e as 503 P.2d 1210

HENRIOD, Justice:
Appeal from a judgment quashing an
information. Affirmed.
The State says that Ludlow obstructed an
officer in performing his duty. 1 This was
based on a refusal to bring a female employee out of the factory so that a deputy
sheriff could serve her with a Small Claims
Court order. At preliminary examination
it was unrefuted that Ludlow had no objection to the service during the various
work breaks, including coffee, but not during working hours, where boat manufacture
work involved dangers if work were impeded. Words flew between the deputy
and the employer which prevented the dove
of peace from lighting on either's shoulders,
where there remained but chips. Each may
have suffered hurt feelings.
The briefs said a lot about the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments, favorite topics at
the bridge club, local taverns and the
Supreme Court, all about searches and seizures, cabbages and kings and the like
which fashion the American scene,—but it
appears that the deputy here unduly pressed
his prestige with its attendant duty and
authority, considering that it could have
been displayed at the lunch hour, at a coffee

break, or a rest period in such fashion that
its eminence would not have been canvassed in this court.
The distinctions indulged in the briefs
about statutory and common law, dwellings,
and curtilages, searches and seizures,
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and
the like need not decide this case. We
know of no rule and don't intend to initiate
one, where immediacy, necessity, threatened
flight or anything else that might interrupt
normal business activities, where another
avenue for serving process is available,
would compel an employer to "produce"
his employee as the state claims he must,
to satisfy the arbitrary and self-determined
approach chosen by the process server to
serve his own convenience. Such a rule
might subject an employer to a false arrest
confrontation if he dragged his employee
through an assemblage of co-workers into
the front office to face not only a lawman's badge but the humiliation arising by
innuendo incident thereto pointing to some
kind of wrong-doing. We do not think
such a situation comports with the mores
of a give and take democracy.
We believe and hold that under the circumstances of this particular case the trial
court did not err. Without being unduly
philosophical, we might suggest that had
tempers not flared, this case would not
have been here. We are not constrained to
use the facts of this case to render a
declaratory judgment in what appears to be
a test case which perhaps is travelling along
the wrong track. We think Ludlow may
have been a mite more cooperative, and the
deputy a smidgeon less insistent, but they
weren't, and who isn't these days,—and we
think that neither had any wrongful intent,
—but simply played the role of umpire and
fan at the ball game of usuality.
CALLISTER, C. J., and T U C K E T T and
CROCKETT, JJ., concur.
E L L E T T , J., concurs in the result.

I. Title 76-2S-34, Utah Code Annotated 1953.

EXHIBIT II
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tions into criminal activity; yet as noted
above, subdivision (b) of the statute expressly directs him to consult that source
in determining eligibility for diversion.
Secondly, the decision of the district attorney that a defendant is ineligible on
this ground is subject to judicial review
at the proper time. A pretrial writ of
mandate or prohibition will not lie, as the
determination is purely preliminary and
there is no indication the Legislature intended the prosecution to be interrupted
for interlocutory review of this issue
(compare Pen.Code, §§ 999a, 1538.5).5
But if the defendant goes to trial and is
convicted, he may raise on appeal the
question whether there was "evidence,"
as defined herein, of his commission of
other narcotics offenses within the meaning of subsection (3) of subdivision ( a ) ; 6
if the defendant prevails, the judgment
must be set aside and the case remanded
to permit the trial court to exercise its
discretion to divert the defendant under
the remaining portions of the statute.
[3] We conclude that the preliminary
screening for eligibility conducted by the
district attorney pursuant to section 1000,
based on information peculiarly within his
knowledge and in accordance with stanards prescribed by the statute, does not
constitute an exercise of judicial authority and hence does not violate the constitutional requirement of separation of
powers. 7
The alternative writ is discharged and
peremptory writ is denied.

PEOPLE 7. WETZEL

WRIGHT, C. J., and McCGMB, TOBRINER, BURKE and SULLIVAN, JJ.,
concur.
CLARK, Justice (concurring).
I concur in the judgment and that part
of the opinion stating the district attorney's determination of eligibility under
section 1000 is not a judicial act.

O

I KEY HUMBCft S T S U M .

113 Cal.Rptr. 32
The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Res pond tut,
v.
Sherrie Jean WETZEL, Defendant
and Appellant.
Cr. 16914.
Supreme Court of California,
In Bank.
April 4, 1974.

Defendant was convicted in the Superior Court, Los Angeles County, Richard
F. C. Hayden, J., of possession of restricted dangerous drugs, and she appealed, contending that her arrest and subsequent
search were unlawful. The Supreme Court,
Wright, C. J., held that defendant who
stood in doorway of apartment and who
refused to give consent to officers who requested permission to enter to search for
juvenile suspected of breaking window did

Cite as 520 P 2d 416

not thereby obstruct officer in performance of his duties.
Reversed.
Clark, J., filed dissenting opinion in
which McComb and Burke, JJ., joined.
Opinion, Cal.App., 106 Cal.Rptr. 651,
vacated.
I. Obstructing Justice <§=>7
Defendant who stood in doorway of
apartment and who refused to give consent
to officers who requested permission to enter to search for juvenile suspected of
breaking window did not thereby obstruct
officer in performance of his duties.
West's Ann.Pen.Code, § 148.
2. Arrest <§=>68
Where citizen informant had provided
officers with fresh information which had
been proved to be reliable, officers did not
need search warrant to enter apartment in
hot pursuit of criminal suspect based on informant's belief that suspect had entered
apartment.

Richard H. Levin, Los Angeles, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and
Kathleen J. Kirkland, Alhambra, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for defendant and appellant.
Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Edward
A. Hinz, Jr., Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., William E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., Norman
H. Sokolow, Frederick R. Millar, Jr., and
Beverly K. Falk, Deputy Attys. Gen., for
plaintiff and respondent.
WRIGHT, Chief Justice.

5. In the case at bar we permitted the issue to
be raised by petition for extraordinary writ
because of the need for a prompt and definitive
resolution of this constitutional challenge to
a new statutory program. (Cf. San Francisco
Unified School Dist. v. Johnson (1971) 3 Cal.
3d 937, 944-945, 92 Cal.Rptr. 309, 479 P.2d
669.)
6. In order for this review to be effective, of
course, an adequate record is necessary. Accordingly, at the time the district attorney determines the defendant is ineligible for diversion he should serve on the defendant and file

with the court a declaration stating the ground
upon which that determination is based and
the evidence in support thereof.
7. The presence of these statutory standards
also refutes defendant's final claim that section 1000 denies him due process of law; and
inasmuch as the resulting ineligibility of persons who ha\e a history of drug abuse or
crimes of violence is rationally related to the
purposes of this legislation identified in On
Tai Ho (ante, p. 23 of 113 Cal.Rptr., p.
407 of 520 P.2d), no denial of equal protection
is shown.

[1] Defendant appeals from a judgment (order granting probation) entered
•• All statutory references, unless otherwise
indicated, are to sections of the Penal Code.
Defendant has preserved her right to appeal on the issue presented notwithstanding
her guilty plea. (See §§ 1237, 1237.5, 153S.5,
subd. (m).) She was initially charged with
violations of section 148 and Health and Safety Code section 11910 and entered not guilty
Pleas. Her motion for dismissal pursuant
to section 995 was denied, and her motion
for suppression of evidence pursuant to sec520 P 2d—27

Cal.
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upon a plea of guilty of possession of Seconal, a restricted dangerous drug. (Health
& Saf. Code, § 11910.) She contends that
she was unlawfully arrested for obstructing an officer in the performance of his
duties (Pen.Code, § 148) when she passively asserted a constitutional right, and that
contraband discovered during a search of
her person pursuant to the arrest was unlawfully received in evidence. We agree
with defendant's contentions. As the contraband was the sole evidence of defendant's guilt the judgment must be reversed. 1
At approximately 4 a. m. on a date in
May 1971 police officers responded to a
burglary alarm in the vicinity of defendant's apartment. They were informed by a
citizen in the neighborhood that he had observed the flight of three juveniles after
they had smashed the window of a- store
building. One of the juveniles had gone to
a nearby parking lot, and the officers apprehended a suspect at the lot.
The citizen informer reported that he
was of the opinion that a second suspect
entered defendant's apartment. Two officers went to the apartment and, through a
partially open door, observed several persons asleep inside. An officer knocked on
the door, awoke defendant, advised her of
the circumstances and requested permission
to enter the apartment and search for the
suspect. Defendant told the officers to
"Get the hell out of here if you don't have
a damn warrant." An officer explained
that they did not need a warrant in the circumstances, but defendant nevertheless
continued to refuse permission to enter.
During the course of the conversation defendant, who was fully clothed, stepped off
the bed pnto the interior threshold of the
tion 1538.5, submitted on the transcript of
proceedings had at the preliminary hearing
and additional testimony, was likewise denied.
Thereafter she withdrew her plea of not
guilty as to the possession charge and entered a guilty plea. The obstructing charge
was dismissed in the interest of justice, proceedings were suspended and defendant was
placed on probation for a period of five years.
This appeal followed.

418
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open doorway. She was next threatened
with arrest for obstructing an officer in
carrying out his duties, but she remained
adamant in the absence of a warrant. An
officer then seized defendant, turned her
around and put handcuffs on her. The officers then entered and a search of the
apartment failed to reveal the suspect. 2
At no time during the foregoing events
did defendant in any way physically confront the officers, limiting her objections
to verbal abuse and protests and standing
passively in the doorway during the verbal
exchange. 3 She offered no physical resistance to either her arrest or the officers'
entry. Following the arrest she was removed to a police station where a booking
search of her person disclosed the challenged contraband.
The crux of defendant's contention is
that her acts were nothing more than a
passive assertion of a constitutional right
and that such acts cannot form the basis
for criminal conduct. If her conduct did
not constitute grounds for her arrest then,
of course, the search of her person was an
invasion of her Fourth Amendment rights
and the evidence seized should have been
suppressed. (Wong Sun v. United States
(1963), 371 U.S. 471, 487-488, 83 S.Ct. 407,
9 L.Ed.2d 441.)
[2] Preliminarily it should be stated that
the officers were clearly correct in their
2. The suspect was not found in the apartment but was later apprehended in the immediate vicinity thereof. From their position
at the door the officers could observe the
whole of the interior of the one-room apartment except for the bathroom.
The foregoing account of events leading to
defendant's arrest is, as it must be for purposes of appellate review, consistent with
the testimony of the People's witnesses.
Defendant's version is somewhat different.
She testified that when she was aroused
from her sleep officers were already in the
apartment and the door, which she had closed
before retiring, was open. The officers did
not explain their presence other than to
advise that she was being placed under arrest
for burglary. In this connection, at the
preliminary hearing the arresting officer testified that defendant's statement to him was
"get the hell out of here if you don't have"
a warrant. (Italics added.)

assertion that they did not need a search
warrant in order to enter an apartment in
hot pursuit of a criminal suspect. The citizen informant had provided them with
fresh information which had already been
proved to be reliable. (See Warden v.
Hayden (1967), 387 U.S. 294, 298, 87 S.Ct.
1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782; People v. Gilbert
(1965), 63 Cal.2d 690, 706, 47 Cal.Rptr.
909, 408 P.2d 365.) The critical issue,
however, is whether the officers were in
fact obstructed in carrying out their right
to enter without a warrant.
The People take the position that because the trial court found on substantial
evidence that there was probable cause to
arrest defendant for a violation of section
148, the issue of the propriety of her arrest
is foreclosed. They argue that defendant's
obstruction of the officers consisted of the
mere act of standing in an open doorway
in such a manner that she would have had
to be pushed aside in order that the officers might have made an entry. The People concede that defendant had the right to
refuse her consent, but claim that her actions "went beyond a mere refusal to consent and actually amounted to a deliberate
resistance, delay and obstruction" because
the officers "having once determined that
their reinforcements were in position
. . . had to move [defendant] before
they could enter." 4
3. Testimony elicited at the hearing upon
the motion to suppress under section 1538.5
disclosed that one of the two officers who
confronted defendant was 35 years of age,
6 feet 2 inches tall and weighed 217 pounds.
The other officer was 37 years of age, 6 feet
tall and weighed 220 pounds. Defendant was
22 years of age, 5 feet 2 inches in height
and weighed 117 pounds.
4. Although the officers might have properly
entered in hot pursuit of the suspect it appears that they elected not to do so and
continued to seek defendant's consent to
their entry up to the very moment of her
arrest. During the period of confrontation
other officers took positions outside the
ground-level apartment where they might apprehend the suspect should the entry cause
him to attempt to flee the vicinity.

PEOPLE v. WETZEL
Cal. 419
Cite as 520 P 2d 416
There can be no question that defendant make a lawful arrest, and therefore with
could have exercised her right of refusal grounds to force an entry. We stated in
to a requested entry by officers, and the that case that the defendant was not rePeople so concede. According to the Peo- quired to open the door on demand thereple's witnesses she was repeatedly request- for and, quoting from Tompkins v. Superied to give her consent to the entry and, as or Court (1963), 59 Cal.2d 65 at page 68,
a reason why she should give such consent, 27 Cal.Rptr. 889 at page 891, 378 P.2d 113
it was argued to her that the officers could at page 115, further stated: " 'If refusal of
nevertheless effect an entry without that permission to enter could convert mere
consent. But at no time prior to defend- suspicion of crime into probable cause to
ant's arrest did the officers actually at- arrest . . ., such suspicion alone would
tempt or state that they intended to make
become the test of the right to enter, and
such an entry. Nor is there any substan- the right to be free from unreasonable potial evidence which would support a con- lice intrusions would be vitiated by its
clusion that had the officers attempted to mere assertion.' . . . Refusal to open
exercise their right to enter because they the door is obviously not a public offense.
were in hot pursuit defendant would have
(Pen.Code, §§ 69, 148.)" (People v. Cresphysically resisted. 5
Defendant's entire sey, supra, 2 Cal.3d 836, 841-842, fn. 6, 87
course of conduct was directed to refusal
Cal.Rptr. 699, 703, 471 P.2d 19, 23.)
of consent, and nothing more. Although
Cressey thus suggests that the refusal to
she had positioned herself in the open open a door on proper police demand candoorway, it appeared to be the only posi- not constitute a violation of section 148,
tion she could assume while conversing and it requires no extension in principle to
with the officers. 8 Had she complied with
hold in the instant case that the refusal to
the officer's requests and stood back from
stand aside and permit a requested entry,
the doorway this in itself would have, un- even when officers as in Cressey had a
der the circumstances, constituted the very right to force an entry, likewise cannot
consent which she was not required to constitute a violation of section 148. The
give. (See People v. Cressey (1970), 2 People, however, argue that Cressey is inCal.3d 836, 841, 87 Cal.Rptr. 699, 471 P.2d
applicable because in that case the defend19.) W e conclude accordingly, and as a ant was entitled to remain passive and
matter of law, that defendant's total con- could not be compelled to take the demandduct cannot be characterized other than a ed affirmative action in cooperation with
refusal to consent to a request to enter her the police. In the instant case, the People
apartment. Such conduct cannot constitute contend, defendant did not merely remain
grounds for a lawful arrest or subsequent passive; she interposed herself in the
search and seizure.
doorway and thus created an additional obIn People v. Cressey, supra, 2 Cal.3d 836,
87 Cal.Rptr. 699, 471 P.2d 19 the defendant
refused to open the door of his residence
on demand of an officer with grounds to
5. The officer who carried on the verbal exchange with defendant testified as follows:
"Q. Whatever occurred between jou and
[defendant] at the door did not bar you
from making an entry and bar you from
making a search; you performed your duties as jou desired to do them? A. Yes,
1
did. . . . Q. Did she make any statements indicating to you that you were going
to have to move her out of the way? A.
Not in those exact words. Q. In other

stacle which had not been present when the
officers arrived at the doorway.
The People's distinction of
Cressey
would be valid if, contrary to the undisputwords, she was just sajing words to the
effect that she had said earlier, 'You're not
going in here unless you ha\e a warrant'
or majbe language a little more uuladjlike?
A. Yes, sir."
6. The bed from which defendant arose was
immediately to her left, and the door in its
open position was immediately on her right,
as she faced the officers at the doorway.

420
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ed facts in this case, defendant had blocked
the doorway and impeded the officers in
making an entry in hot pursuit
Here,
however, the officers awoke defendant
from a sound sleep and stood at the doorway while they made repeated requests of
her There is no substantial evidence m
support of any conclusion other than that
she came to the doorway only in response
to the officers' attempts to discuss the
question of their entry and persuade her to
give consent The record thus fails to support the factual basis for the People's distinction of Cressey 7
It is immaterial in the view we take of
the case that defendant's insistence on a
warrant was not well founded
She had
the right to withhold consent to enter and,
as long as entry was not sought on any
other ground than with her consent she
committed no impropriety and certainly not
a violation of section 148 (See District
of Columbia v Little (1950), 339 U S 1,
5-6, 70 S Ct 468, 94 L E d 599, Miller v
United States (5th Cir 1956), 230 F 2 d
486, 487-488)
Defendant's arrest being unlawful, the
search and seizure which followed were
also unlawful and the contraband evidence
should have been suppressed
The judgment is reversed
7. In fact, it affirmatively appears that the
entry was delayed by design and not by any
volitional conduct of defendant One officer
testified at the preliminary hearing that
approximately 10 minutes elapsed from the
time he arrived at the apartment until he
arrested defendant The officers delajed un
til back up units were positioned and then
entered without opposition
1. In an appeal under Penal Code section
1538 5, subdivision (m), the record must, of
course, be viewed in the light most favorable
to the party prevailing below (See People
v Superior Court (Peck) (1974), 10 Cal 3d
645, 649, 111 CalRptr 565 517 P2d 829
People v Lazier (1973), 9 Cal 3d 156, 160,
107 CalRptr 13, 507 P2d 621, People v
West (1970), 3 Cal 3d 595, 602, 91 Cal
Rptr 3S5, 477 P 2d 409)
2. "Q Where did [defendant] stand in rela
tion to that threshold** A Just in front of

TOBRINER, MOSK and SULLIVAN,
JJ , concur
CLARK, Justice (dissenting)
I dissent The majority concedes that
blocking a doorway is a violation of Penal
Code section 148 if an officer is thereby
wilfully impeded from making an entry in
hot pursuit
(Ante, p 419) Therefore,
defendant's conviction should be affirmed,
because that is exactly what she did *
Defendant unquestionably blocked the
doorway by standing in front of it and refusing to move 2 The contention that defendant simply took "the only position she
could assume while conversing with the officers" (ante, p 419) is undercut by the
fact that she spoke with them for several
minutes without getting out of bed 3
Moreover, even assuming arguendo that
she did have to stand in the doorway to
talk to the officers, she should have
stepped aside when ordered to do so
The majority objects
"Had she complied with the officer's requests and stood
back from the doorway this in itself would
have, under the circumstnaces, constituted
the very consent which she was not required to give " (Ante, p 419 ) The objection is not well founded Consent given
in submission to an assertion of authe door, directly in front of the door Q
Would she have had to move in order for
jou to get into the premises*> A Yes, sir,
she would have
Q Now, jou felt
that jou could not walk into the apartment
without at least walking over her, there
was no room to walk to the side of her 7
A No, sir, there was not"
3. "Q At what point in time did [defendant]
get off the bed' A After she began jelling
the profanities and we requested several
times and advised her several times of the
situation, she then aroused from the bed
very angrilj " ' Q And after jou first
knocked on the door and my client was
awakened how much time elapsed before—
we have a general ten minute period—how
much of that ten minutes, approximately,
before my client got off the bed, fne minutes, would that be fair' A Perhaps"
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thority is involuntary and without legal ef- peatedly refused permission to enter, the
fect
(See Bumper v North Carolina officers advised defendant a search warrant was unnecessary and threatened to ar(1968), 391 U S 543, 548-549, 88 S Ct
rest her if she did not move 4
1788, 20 L E d 2d 797, People v Shelton
(1964), 60 Cal 2d 740, 746, 36 CalRptr
The absence of forceful resistance (ante,
433, 388 P2d 665, People v Michael p 419) is beside the point "[T]he use of
(1955), 45 Cal 2d 751, 753, 290 P2d 852)
force is not an element in the violation of
The question whether a defendant's con
section 148" (In re Culver (1968), 69
sent was coerced by a claim of authority is Cal 2d 898, 905, fn 10, 73 CalRptr 393,
to be decided in light of all the facts and 397, 447 P 2 d 633, 637) "Unlike section
circumstances
(See People v Smith 834a, which applies only to forceful resist(1966), 63 Cal 2d 779, 798, 48 CalRptr
ance, section 148 penalizes even passive de382, 409 P2d 222, People v Bilderbach lay or obstruction of an arrest, such as re(1965), 62 Cal 2d 757, 762-763, 44 Cal Rptr
fusal to cooperate"
(People v Curtis
313, 401 P 2 d 921, see also People v West
(1969), 70 Cal 2d 347, 356, £n 6, 74 Cal.
(1970), 3 Cal 3d 595, 602, 91 CalRptr 385, Rptr 713, 718, 450 P 2 d 33, 3 8 )
477 P 2d 409 ) Stepping aside could not
The conviction should be affirmed.
have been construed as anything other than
submission to an explicit assertion of authority here because, after having been re4 "Q Did you ever tell [defendant] to step
aside so jou could enter*' A Several
times Q That is after she got off the
bed and faced tou' A l e s sir Q And
what did she saj or do? A Again jelling
profanities and asking for a search warrant
Q How were jou able to get her out of
your waj "> A Lpon adwsing her numerous

McCOMB and BURKE, JJ , concur.
times to mo\e and she refused to, we ad
vised her that if she didn't move that she
would be placed under arrest for interfering
with us in performance of our dutj
She
failed to move We then placed her under
arrest and began our search of the apart
ment for the suspect"

